ABSTRACTS OF RECENT DECISIONS.

the arrest would not be legal. If an action had been brought
against the officers for making the arrest, and they had pleaded a
plea of justification under the warrant, they must, according to the
precedents, have pleaded it was delivered to them to be executed;
and though it is not stated in the precedents they should have
actual possession at the time of the arrest, it is to be presumed,
from the allegation of delivery to them, that they continued to
hold it. MacKalley's case, 9 Coke, 69 a, is distinguishable on the
ground suggested by East in his treatise on Pleas of the Crown,
vol. i. p. 318. See also in 1st Hale's Pleas of the Crown, 458.
We an unable to find any case in which the precise point raised
for our discussion has been decided. We are, therefore, of opinion
that the officers making the arrest ought to have had the warrant
with them, ready to be produced in case it should be required, and
not having it they were not justified in making the arrest. As to
the second point, we are clearly of opinion that the withdrawal
of the information as to the rescue afforded no valid ground of
objection to the proceeding under the information for the assault.
Therefore the conviction will be quashed.

ABSTRACTS OF RECENT AMERICAN DECISIONS.
SUPREMIE COURT OF NEW YORK. 1

Warranty on a Sale of Chattels-Rule of Damages for Breach of.Where a warranty of a thing has reference to a purpose for which it is to
be used, the rule of indemnity on a breach of the warranty must include
the damages which naturally followed, and might be expected to follow,
its violation, when the thing warranted is put to the intended and understood use: provided such damages are in their nature certain, and it is
also certain that they proceeded from the breach of warranty: Passenger
vs. Thorburn.
- The plaintiff, a market-gardener, applied to the defendant for seed of a
particular kind of cabbage-the Bristol. The defendant being acquainted
with the plaintiff's business, and the purpose for which the seed was
1 From Hon. 0. L. Barbour, Reporter.
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wanted, professed to have that seed, and showed him a sample of the cabbage the seed would produce; said he knew the seed was Bristol cabbage
seed, and warranted it as such. The seed being purchased and planted,
proved not to be of the Bristol cabbage, and produced a crop of but little
value. Reld, that the rule of damages was such loss as the plaintiff had
sustained by the crop not being what the warranty in substance said it
should be-Bristol cabbage: Id.
Latent Ambzguit#y-Fedor and Purchaser: Tender of Deed-L. uidated Damages.-Where, in a contract for the sale and conveyance of land,
there was no other description of the premises except what was contained
in the words "1his farm," it being clear, from the contract, that these words
referred to the vendor's farm, it was held to be a case of latent ambiguity
which was susceptible of explanation by parol evidence: Brinkerhoff vs.
Olp, Executor, &c.
Where a purchaser dies before the period when, by the terms of the
contract, the first payment is to be made, and possession of the land given,
a separate tender of the deed to all the heirs or devisees of the purchaser
is not necessary. It is sufficient if a deed, conveying the premises to the
heirs and devisees, be tendered to the executor, who represents the testator's means of paying the purchase-money: Id.
By an executory contract for the sale and purchase of land, the parties
Found themselves, each unto the other, "in the penal sum of $200, as
fixed and settled damages to be paid by the failing party." ReId, that
the sum named was intended as liquidated damages, and not as a penalty : Id.
Fixtures; as between MTortgagor and Mortgagee; Action for their
Removal; what are such.-In determining whether articles are or are not
fixtures, the same rule prevails between mortgagor and mortgagee as
between grantor and grantee, and this whether the mortgagee were or
were not in possession of the premises: Lafliu vs. Griffithts, Sheriff.
If articles, before being detached, were fixtures, the person having the
title to the realty can, in case of their removal by another, sue for the
specific recovery of the things themselves, or in trespass for the damages
to the freehold : Rd.
Though the mortgage debt has become satisfied by the mortgagee's purchasing the premises, at a foreclosure sale, this will not alter his rights in
respect to fixtures attached to a building and wrongfully removed there-
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from by another. If, at the time of such removal, the mortgagee had the
title, even though it were a conditional one, that is sufficient to found an
action against the wrongdoer: Id.
Where articles of machinery were attached to a building by braces and
nails, having been so attached when the building was erected, and having
always continued so attached, and the sole use of the building being the
accommodation and employment of such machinery, it was held that the
articles of machinery were to be deemed fixtures: d.
Vendor and Purchaser-Rescindingof Contrat.-Before a purchaser
can rescind the contract of purchase, and claim to recover back moneys
paid by him pn account of the price, he is bound to restore to the vendor
the possession of the premises. He cannot occupy under the contract,
and thus enjoy the benefit of it, and at the same time treat it as rescinded,
and reclaim the purchase-money: Goelth vs. IT'hte.
The money can only be recovered back when the contract has been
rescinded in toto, and so long as the purchaser is reaping the fruits of it,
it is not wholly rescinded : Id.
Jtarried Woman; Her Capacity to make Executoryl Contracts.-The
act of March 20, 1860, concerning the rights and liabilities of husband
and wife, by exempting the husband from all liability upon or in respect
to bargains or contracts made by the wife in or about the carrying on of
her trade or business, recognises the ability of the wife to make executory
contracts, which will be valid as against her, notwithstanding her coverture:
Barton vs. Beer.
Usury.-Any security given in payment or discharge of an usurious
security, is equally void with the original. The original taint of usury
attaches to all consecutive obligations and securities growing out of the
original vicious transaction : Vickery vs. Dickson.
A new security of the borrower for the same debt, secured by an usasious mortgage, would be vitiated by the usury; and t6e obligation of a
third person stands upon no better foundation: Id.
Opinions of Witnesses.-Although, as a general rule, opinions of witnesses are to be excluded, except upon questions of science and skill as
to which they have been specially instructed or educated, yet witnesses
may give their opinion upon questions of value, and as to the amount of
damages a party has sustained, where the damage consists in an injury to,
or destruction of property: Nellis vs. Me Cam.
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Partnersldp.-Moneyoriginally borrowed by one partner, in his indidual capacity, and a third person, upon their joint note, and subsequently
by the consent of such third person agreed to be appropriated to the
borrowing partner's individual use, cannot be collected of the firm or the
other partner, merely from the fact that they have had the benefit of it in
their business, or that the account of it is entered on their books ; especially where the evidence shows that neither the original loan, nor that
from the third person to the borrowing partner, was made upon the credit
or for the benefit of the firm: Tallmadge vs. Panoyer.
Guaranty.-The defendants purchased of the plaintiff his interest in
a stock of goods, and in part payment therefor transferred to him the
note of B., indorsing thereon a guaranty of payment, but which guaranty,
on its face, expressed no consideration. .eld, that the case was within
the decisions which hold that where a guaranty is made for the purpose of
paying the party's own debt, it is not a collateral, but an original undertaking, and so good without expressing the consideration: Fowler vs.
Ctearivater.
The taking of such a note, by a vendor, operates as a giving of credit,
to its maturity, and will prevent the statute of limitations from being a
bar: Id.
Deed; Parol Evidence of consideration-ParolPromise to pay Debt
of Another.-Parol evidence is admissible to show for what consideration,
and in what manner a grantee agreed to pay for the land conveyed to her
by deed: Seaman vs. Hersbrouck.
A parol promise of a party, to whom a conveyance of lands is made,
for the purpose to pay, -on account of the consideration, certain debts
owing by the grantor to third persons, is valid and obligatory upon the
promissor without the concurrence or consent of the creditors having been
given to the arrangement, and without any suspension or extinguishment
of the claims of those creditors, as against the original debtor: 1d.
If the grantee has already paid the debts of the grantor, so agreed to
be paid by her as a part of the purchase-money, that will be a good
defence to an action brought against her by other creditors of the grantor,
to recover the balance claimed to be due on account of the purchasemoney: Id.
ParolLicense to enter -upon Land.-A parol license to enter into the
possession of land is no defence to an action by the owner of the land to
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recover the possession: Eggleston vs. The New York and Harlem Rail.
road Company.
Such a license is not irrevocable, so as to bar the grantor or his heirs
from recovering the possession. It will be revoked by a conveyance of the
land to another person, or by the death of the grantor: Id.
A mere agreement to sell does not, of itself, impart a license to enter
into possession : Id.
Aunicipal Corporations; Liability for Acts of their Agents.-Where
individuals, claiming to be the agents of a municipal corporation, and to
act under resolutions of the Common Council directing the removal of all
obstructions in a particular street, go beyond the limits of the street, upon
premises in the rightful possession of another, and there commit unlawful
acts to the owner's injury, they are personally liable to the owner of the
property, but no action will lie against the corporation: Harvey vs. The
City of Rochester.
The trespasses not being committed by the agents or servants of the
corporation in the performance of the acts directed or authorized by the
resolutions, the corporation cannot be made liable on the principle of respondeat superior: -d.
A Common Council has no authority, by its agents, servants, or otherwise, to enter summarily upon premise§ within the corporate bounds of
the city, which are owned or lawfully possessed by an individual, and there
commit unlawful acts to his injury: id.
If it does so, its acts will be ultra vires, for which the corporation is not
liable; even if the ordinance under the authority of which the wrongful
acts are done specifically direct the doing of those particular acts: Id.

SUPREME COURT OF CONNECTICUT.

1

Bill of Exchange- What sufficient Notice of Protest.-The defendant
was indorser of a bill of exchange drawn by A. on B., and accepted by B.
Notice of the non-payment of the bill by the acceptor was sent to him,
which described the bill as "drawn by you," and wholly omitted the name
of the real drawer, but otherwise described the bill correctly and as indorsed by the defendant. Held, that the notice was sufficient to charge
IFrom John Hooker, Esq,, State Reporter.
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the defendant, in the absence of proof on his part that he had drawn any
such bill, or that he had indorsed any other paper of the same general
description which could have been mistaken by him for the bill in question : Gill vs. Palmer.
Deed, where Merger of previous Contract-ParolEvidence.-The defendant agreed to sell the plaintiffs a patent right for the making of sewing
machines, within a certain district, for the sum of $400, for a part of which
the plaintiffs were to give a note and let the defendant have a horse for
the balance, the defendant reserving the right to manufacture machines
within the district. The note was at once given and the horse delivered,
and the defendant thereupon executed and delivered to the plaintiffs a
deed conveying the patent right; the deed stating the amount of the consideration and reserving to the defendant the right of manufacturing
machines in the district, but containing no stipulations as to the quality
of the machines made under the patent. .eld, that the plaintiffs could
not prove by parol evidence that, at the time of the sale and prior to the
execution of the deed, the defendant warranted the machines made under
to work well, and not drop stitches, and to do the various
the patent "C
sewing of a family :" Galpin vs. Atwater.
The deed was regarded upon the facts as the contract of the parties
reduced to writing, and therefore as merging all the prior parol transaction, and not as a mere execution, in part, of a prior and complete parol
contract: 11.
Builder'sLien-Proceedingsto Entforce- Waiver by Acceptance of Afote
-For what given by Statute.-Where the owner of premises which a
builder's lien has attached, has conveyed away his interest in the premises,
it is not necessary to make him a party to a bill to foreclose the lien : Rose
vs. The Persse and Brooks Paper Works.
The statute with regard to a builder's lien provides that the builder
shall file in the office of the town clerk a certificate of his lien, which shall
"describe the premises." A party having a lien on one of three paper
mills, which were near each other, and belonged to the same owner, but
were independent and susceptible of a separate description, described the
premises on which the lien was claimed, as "two tracts of land situated
in the town of W., one bounded [&c.], with two paper mills thereon, and
the other bounded [&c.], with one paper mill thereon," and described the
lien as "for materials furnished and services rendered in the erection and

ABSTRACTS OF RECENT DECISIONS.

repairs of said several paper mills." Held, that the certificate was void,
as not containing a reasonably accurate description of the premises within
the meaning of the statute: Id.
A party having a builder's lien took notes for the amount of his claim,
and gave a receipt as follows-" Received of P. & B. two notes [describing them], in full."-Whether the lien was not discharged thereby:
Quere. The court inclined to the opinion that, in the absence of proof
that the receipt did not exceed the real understanding of the parties, it
must be taken to mean that the notes were received in payment, and be
regarded as discharging the lien : Md.
The statute gives a lien for materials furnished and services rendered in
construction, erection or repairs of any building. Where the materials
and labor furnished were in the equipping with fixed machinery for the
manufacture of paper, a building intended in its erection as a paper mill,
but which was in itself a complete and independent structure, it was held
that they could not be regarded as furnished for the construction or reparation of a building, and that no lien attached to the premises in favor of
the party furnishing the same: Id.
Assignment of Debt, where in Equity Transfer of Securities-Right of
Creditor to Securities held by a Surety- Covenant not to Sue-Pleading
in Equity.-Where a mortgage is given to secure a debt, whether the debt
be in a negotiable form or not, a transfer of the debt transfers in equity
the security, if the security has not previously been surrendered by the
creditor: Jones vs. The Quinnipiack Bank.
But where a mortgage is given, not to secure a debt, but to indemnify
a surety, there the security does not in the first instance attach to the debt,
as an incident to it, but whatever equity may arise in favor of the creditor'
with regard to the security, arises afterwards, and comes into existence
only upon the insolvency of the parties holden for the debt: Id.
Until this equity arises, the surety has a right, in equity as well as law,
to release the security : id.
And the equity of the creditor in such a case not being an inherent one,
growing out of the contract, but resulting merely from a state of facts
which entitles him to equitable relief, and becoming fixed only by the
interposition of a court of equity, it seems that the relief cannot be
furnished, even though insolvency has intervened, unless the security is
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still retained by the surety at the time of the application of the creditor
for relief: Id.
J. mortgaged certain real estate to B., to secure him for accepting his
drafts to the amount of $50,000. Most of the drafts were at once drawn
and accepted. The condition of the mortgage was that J.should pay at
maturit all such acceptancesand save B. harmless therefron. A few days
after, J. desiring to procure a loan from Q., an arrangement was made
under which B. mortgaged to Q. all his interest in the mortgaged premises
for the security of the loan, and Q., upon the security, advanced $30,000
to J. Both J. and B. intended to give to Q., and Q. supposed that he
was acquiring an interest that was equivalent to a first mortgage of the
premises. J. and B. were both at this time solvent and in good credit, but
afterwards failed. At the time of their failure the loan to Q. was unpaid,
as were also the acceptances of B. under the original mortgage; which
latter were then held by parties to whom they had been negotiated. Upon
a bill in equity brought by certain holders of these acceptances, against
Q., for the application of the mortgaged premises to the payment of the
acceptances, it was held, 1. That the mortgage was to be regarded as a
personal security to B. for his acceptances for J., and not as a security for
the bills so accepted. 2. That while J. and B. were solvent, no equity
arose with regard to the security in favor of the holders of the bills. 3.
That while no such equities existed B. had a perfect right to surrender
the security to J., or with his concurrence to make a transfer of it to Q.,
as security for the loan made by the latter to J. 4. That the right thus
acquired by Q., was not affected by the equity in favor of the holders of
the bills which arose afterwards upon the failure of J.and B.: Id.
0., one of the petitioners, had received certain of the bills from J., as
collateral security for a temporary loan, with an agreement that after the
loan was paid 0. might, at his option, return the bills, or retain them in
the place of certain other paper of J.held by 0. 0. knew, at the time,
of the mortgage to B., but had no knowledge of the transaction with Q.
The temporary loan was soon after paid, but C. did not exercise his right
of option until some weeks after, when he had heard of the conveyance of
the security to Q. and of the loan of Q. upon it, and he then elected to
retain the bills and give up the other paper, and in doing so had it in view
to secure the benefit of the mortgage. fHeld, that he must be regarded as
having taken the bills at the time when he elected to retain them, and not
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at the time when they were delivered to him, and to have taken them,
therefore, with notice of the rights of Q.: Id.
A covenant not to sue, is in equity a release: Id.
Where two persons unite as petitioners in a bill of equity, if either is
not entitled to relief, the bill must be dismissed as to both: Id.

SUPREME

COURT OF

MASSACHUSETTS.

1

Conveyance in Fraudof Creditors-Evidence-Intereston Judgment.For the purpose of proving a fraudulent intent on the part of a grantor of
real estate, evidence is competent to show that, on the same day of making
the conveyance in question, he conveyed to near relatives all his other real
and personal estate not exempt from seizure on execution; but evidence
of his subsequent acts and declarations is incompetent: Taylor vs.
Robinson.
In levying an execution upon land, interest on the judgment may be
computed to the time when the levy is completed: 1d.
Fire Ansurance--Representations in Application, when Warranty.One who accepts a policy of insurance in which it is expressly provided
that it is agreed and declared that the policy is made and accepted upon
and in reference to the application filed in the office, is thereby concluded
from .denying that the application is his, and cannot set up that it was
made by an agent employed by him to procure insurance upon his property, but without authority to bind him by representations in the application: Draper vs. Charter Oak Fire Insurance Company.
A denial in the application that incumbrances exist upon property to he
insured, in reply to a direct inquiry upon that subject, when in fact mortgages thereon do exist, and are known to exist by the applicant, will
avoid a policy issued on such application by a stock insurance company,
for a premium fully prepaid, if the policy states upon its face that it is
agreed and declared that it is made and accepted upon and in reference to
the application, and to terms and conditions of insurance annexed, one of
which provides that such application shall be taken and deemed to be a
part of the policy, and a warranty on the part of the assured; although
the application contains also a provision, at the end of it, that the applicant covenants that "the foregoing is a full, just and true exposition of
1 From Charles Allen, Esq., State Reporter.
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all the facts and circumstances in regard to the condition, situation, value
and risk of the property to be insured, so far as the same are known to
the applicant, and are material to the risk :" .1d.
Easement-Equitable.Jurisdiction.-Theright to use land for a millyard may exist as an easement, for the disturbance of which a bill in
cquity may be sustained: Gurney vs. Ford.
A bill in equity, seeking relief for an obstruction of a way to the plaintiff's mill, and alleging it to be a public way, is not sustained by proof of
the existence of a private way: .d.
Assmpst- Tender -Contract -Action.-One who has paid a portion
of the price for a piece of land, under an oral contract for the purchase
thereof, and is ready and able to pay the residue upon delivery to him of
a deed of the land, according to the terms of the contract, may recover
back the money so paid by him without proving a formal tender of the
residue of the money, if the vendor, upon request by the vendee, has
refused to perform his part of the contract: Cook vs. Doggett.
If one enters into possession of land under a verbal contract for the
purchase of the same, and cuts the grass thereon, and puts it into the
owner's barn without being requested by the owner to do so, and the
owner afterwards refuses to fulfil the contract, no action lies to recover for
the expense of cutting the grass: Id.
MAill-Right to ErectDam-Prescription.-Tbeowner of land through
which a stream of water passes, may lawfully build and maintain upon his
own land a dam across the stream, for a fish-pond, although he thereby
prevents the flowing back of water upon his land from the dam of a millowner below, which has not been maintained long enough to give a right
by prescription: Wood vs. Edes.
.Tusband and Wife-Presumptionof Legitimacy.-The presumption of
the legitimacy of the child of a married woman can only be rebutted by
evidence which proves beyond all reasonable doubt that her husband could
not have been the father: Phillips vs. Allen.
A child born in eight months after marriage will be presumed to be
legitimate, although, when born, it has all the physical appearances of a
full grown and natural child; and proof of a statement by the mother
that she had no connection with her husband before marriage, and that
her reputation for chastity was bad at the time of her marriage, and that

